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INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
DO NATURAL RESOURCES MATTER? 
Abstract
This paper is intended to demonstrate, in theory as well as empirically, how
increased dependence on natural resources tends to go along with less rapid
economic growth and greater inequality in the distribution of income across
countries. On the other hand, public policy in support of education can
simultaneously enhance equality and growth by raising the return to working
in higher technology (that is, nonprimary) industries and thus counter some
of the potentially adverse effects of excessive natural resource dependence.
Together, these two variables – natural resources and education – can help
account for the inverse relationship between inequality and growth observed
in cross-country data. Moreover, the analysis highlights the role of public
revenue policy. Taxes and fees can be used to reduce the attractiveness of
primary-sector employment, lift the marginal productivity of capital in higher
technology industries and thus increase the rate of interest and economic
growth, while reducing the inequality of income and wealth.
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United Kingdom1. Introduction 
For a long time, many economists were of the view that economic efficiency and 
social equality were essentially incompatible, almost like oil and water. The perceived 
but poorly documented trade-off between efficiency and equality was commonly 
regarded as one of the main tenets of modern welfare economics. One of the key ideas 
behind this perception was that increased inequality could increase private as well as 
social returns to investing in education and exerting effort in the hope of attaining a 
higher standard of life. Redistributive policies were supposed to thwart these 
tendencies and blunt incentives by penalizing the well off through taxation and by 
rewarding the poor. Economic efficiency – both static and dynamic – was bound to 
suffer in the process, or so the argument went.  
More often than not in recent empirical work, measures of income inequality have 
turned out to have a negative effect on economic growth across countries. Thus 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996) report 
that inequality hurts growth. Barro (2000) assesses the relationship between economic 
growth and inequality in a panel of countries over the period from 1965 to 1995 and 
finds – by studying the interaction of the Gini index and the initial level of income in 
a growth regression – that increased inequality tends to retard growth in poor 
countries and boost growth in richer countries.
1 However, Barro finds no support for a 
relationship between inequality and growth in his sample as a whole. Forbes (2000) 
finds that the relationship between inequality and growth becomes positive in a 
pooled regression when country effects are included. She claims that country-specific, 
time-invariant, omitted variables generate a significant negative bias in the estimated 
coefficients reflecting the effects of inequality on growth in pure cross sections and 
mentions corruption and the level of public education as two candidates in this regard. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2000b) claim that this result is misleading, and arises from 
imposing a linear structure on highly nonlinear data.  
The above-mentioned empirical results – showing, by and large, that rapid 
economic growth tends to go along with less, not more, inequality – call for an 
explanation. Thus far, the explanations on offer involve showing how inequality 
                                                 
1 This empirical finding does not support the claim of Garcia-Peñalosa (1995) that in rich countries 
increased inequality discourages education and growth by increasing the number of poor people who 
cannot afford education whereas in poor countries increased inequality encourages education and 
growth by increasing the number of rich people who can afford education. 
  1affects growth either directly or indirectly through its effects on public policy, 
including taxes and transfers and education expenditures. We will now briefly 
describe some of these theories before returning to our proposed thesis, which 
involves natural resources as a joint determinant of both inequality and growth.  
First, large inequalities of income and wealth may trigger political demands for 
transfers and redistributive taxation. To the extent that transfers and taxation distort 
incentives to work, save and invest, inequality may impede growth. It is not clear, 
however, that this type of political-cum-fiscal explanation necessarily implies an 
inverse relationship between inequality and growth, for it is possible that during the 
redistribution phase increased equality and a drop in growth go hand in hand, 
especially in panel data that reflect developments over time country by country as 
well as cross-sectional patterns. Perotti (1996) finds little empirical support for this 
type of explanation. Moreover, in democratic countries with an unequal distribution 
of income and with many poor people, the electorate may vote for more and better 
education as well as higher taxes and transfers (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993, 1996), 
thus obscuring the relationship between inequality and growth. Absent democracy, 
dictators may still find it in their own interest to redistribute incomes and reform 
education in order to promote social peace and strengthen their own hold on political 
power (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). Easterly and Rebelo (1993) report empirical 
results that suggest that increased inequality is associated with both higher taxes and 
more public expenditure on education in a large sample of countries in the period 
1970-1988. 
In second place, the initial extent of inequality probably makes a difference. An 
equalization of incomes and wealth in countries with gross inequities, such as Brazil 
where the Gini index is 60, would seem likely to foster social cohesion and peace and 
thus to strengthen incentives rather than weaken them, whereas in places like 
Denmark and Sweden, where the Gini index is 25 and incomes and wealth are thus 
already quite equitably distributed by world standards, further equalization might well 
have the opposite effect. Excessive inequality may be socially divisive and hence 
inefficient: it may motivate the poor to engage in illegal activities and riots, or at least 
to divert resources from productive uses, both the resources of the poor and those of 
the state. Social conflict over the distribution of income, land or other assets can take 
place through labor unrest, for instance, or rent seeking which can hinder investment 
  2and growth (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996).
2 Alesina and Perotti (1996) report 
empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between inequality and growth through 
socio-political instability.
3  
Third, national saving may be affected by inequality if the rich have a higher 
propensity to save than the poor (Kaldor, 1956). In this case inequality may be good 
for growth in that the greater the level of inequality, the higher is the saving rate and 
hence also investment and economic growth. Against this Todaro (1997) suggests that 
the rich may invest in an unproductive manner – count their yachts and expensive 
cars. Barro (2000) finds no empirical evidence of a link between inequality and 
investment. 
Fourth, increased inequality may hurt education rather than helping it as suggested 
by the political-economy literature referred to at the beginning of this brief discussion. 
If so, increased inequality may hinder economic growth through education. Galor and 
Zeira (1993) and Aghion (1998) argue that this outcome is likely in the presence of 
imperfect capital markets. If each member of society has a fixed number of 
investment opportunities, imperfect access to credit and a different endowment of 
inherited wealth, the rich would end up using many of their investment opportunities 
while the poor could only use a few. Therefore, the marginal return from the last 
investment opportunity of the rich would be much lower than the marginal return of 
the last investment opportunity of the poor. Redistribution of wealth from the rich to 
the poor would increase output because the poor would then invest in more productive 
projects at the margin. This argument can also be applied to investment in human 
capital if we assume diminishing returns to education. In this case, taking away the 
last few quarters of the university education of the elite and adding time to the more 
elementary education of the poor would raise output and perhaps also long-run 
growth, other things being the same. Income redistribution would reverse the decline 
in investment in human capital resulting from the credit-market failure.
4 
The distribution of income and wealth may also affect the amount of public and 
private investment in education. When a large part of the population is poor, it may be 
more likely that the majority of voters will support expenditures on public education 
                                                 
2 Further, Aghion (1998) suggests that excessive inequality may be associated with macroeconomic 
volatility through credit cycles because of unequal access to credit and thus to investment 
opportunities, and that this may hurt investment and growth. 
3 See also Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999).  
4 For a further discussion of recent empirical literature on inequality and growth, see Bénabou (1996).  
  3aimed at the poor, as argued by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993, 1996) and corroborated 
empirically by Easterly and Rebelo (1993), but the effect could also, in principle, go 
the other way. If so, the more deprived and detached from the mainstream population 
is the poorer segment, the less likely the poor are to participate in or affect the 
outcome of elections. As a result the general level of education may suffer – the more 
so, the more capital-constrained is the poorer segment of the population. A virtuous 
circle may arise when redistribution of income leads to an increase or improvement in 
human capital, which then induces voters to prefer higher expenditures on education, 
which again pulls more workers out of poverty, and so on. At an empirical level, we 
would expect increased equality to enhance economic growth through its effect on 
education, and vice versa. That is, more and better general education may be expected 
to reduce public tolerance against extreme inequality and thus to reduce inequality 
through the political process, thereby stimulating economic growth. These processes 
can be mutually reinforcing; that is, if increased social equality encourages education 
and economic growth, this does not mean that more and better education cannot 
similarly, and simultaneously, enhance equality and growth.  
The models reviewed above all have the same basic structure: inequality affects 
some unknown intermediate variable X which, in turn, makes a difference for 
economic growth. In this paper we take a different approach: we view both economic 
growth and inequality of incomes as well as of educational attainment and of land as 
endogenous variables and argue that the inverse relationship between inequality and 
growth does not imply causality one way or the other. We propose an explanation 
which, in contrast to the ones surveyed in the literature reviewed briefly above, 
involves a variable that is exogenous to most economic models. This variable is the 
abundance of, or rather dependence on, natural resources, which we measure by the 
amount of natural capital per person and the share of natural capital in national 
wealth, respectively. We will argue, on theoretical grounds as well as empirically, that 
a direct relationship between natural resource intensity and inequality, on the one 
hand, and between natural resource intensity and growth, on the other hand, can help 
account for the inverse cross-sectional relationship between inequality and growth 
that is observed in the data, assuming that natural resources are given. The first 
relationship – between natural resource intensity and inequality – was documented by 
Bourguignon and Morrison (1990) in a sample of 35 developing countries in 1970, 
while the second relationship – between natural resource intensity and growth – has 
  4been scrutinized by a number of authors in recent years, beginning with Sachs and 
Warner (1995). Moreover, we assume that the ownership of natural resources tends to 
be less equally distributed than other assets within as well as across countries. To the 
extent that this is not the case at the outset, we assume that rent seeking and other 
forces, frequently compounded by a lack of democracy, will see to it that the natural 
resources end up in the hands of a relatively small minority – a military regime, say, 
or a royal family.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set out our view of the way in 
which natural resources can affect inequality and growth. In Section 3, we describe 
the data that we use to measure income inequality and also gender inequality in 
education; we also discuss inequality in the distribution of land. In Section 4, we 
present simple cross-country correlations between three different measures of 
education, three different measures of inequality and economic growth, and thus 
allow the data to speak for themselves. In Section 5, we attempt to dig a little deeper 
and report the results of cross-sectional multiple regression analysis where growth is 
traced to natural resource intensity, education and inequality as well as to other factors 
commonly used in growth regression analysis (investment and initial income), and 
where some of the determinants of growth, including education and inequality, are 
explicitly modeled as endogenous variables. Section 6 concludes the discussion.  
 
2. Resources, distribution and growth 
An important potential weakness of the many stories purporting to explain the 
relationship between inequality and growth is that both of these variables are 
endogenous. This leaves open the possibility that a third, exogenous variable is 
affecting both, thus giving rise to the inverse correlation between the two. 
Specifically, a country’s abundance of, or dependence on, natural resources can under 
many circumstances be viewed as exogenous to models of economic growth and also 
to models attempting to explain the extent of income inequality. But even if we treat 
natural resources as exogenous, we are aware that both natural resource extraction and 
reserves can respond to economic forces; for example, oil prices can influence oil 
production as well as oil exploration. We do not address this problem in this paper, 
but we acknowledge its potential importance; at some point, this problem will need to 
be addressed. Here we want to let it suffice to explore the possibility that natural 
  5resource ownership impinges on both inequality and growth and thus illuminates the 
inverse relationship between inequality and growth that has been observed in cross-
sectional data.  
We will now show how natural resource dependence is inversely related to both 
equality and growth in a standard growth model. Thereafter, we will test this 
prediction empirically in a sample of 87 industrial and developing countries in the 
period 1965-1998. Our theoretical model can be summarized as follows: workers can 
earn a living by either working in the primary sector extracting natural resources from 
the soil or the sea or through paid employment in the manufacturing sector, including 
services. Because human capital is equally spread across the population, wage income 
in manufacturing is the same for all workers. However, due to the whims of nature, or 
the competition for the rent generated by the natural resource, earnings in the primary 
sector are unequal at each point in time. It follows that the more time workers devote 
to natural resource extraction, the more unequal the distribution of income. And 
growth is also affected. If we assume, quite plausibly, that the manufacturing industry 
provides greater opportunities for learning and innovation, it follows that the more 
time workers spend in the primary sector, the lower will be the rate of growth. Hence, 
abundant natural resources cause both inequality and slow growth by tempting 
workers away from industries where technology and output are more likely to 
progress and grow and where earnings are more equally shared. Elsewhere (Gylfason 
and Zoega, 2001b) we show how saving and investment – and hence also growth – 
can depend inversely on natural resources. The intuition is again straightforward: 
when physical capital is less important in the production technology, the optimal rate 
of saving is lower. Therefore, the optimal level of steady-state capital is lower. If we 
now postulate learning-by-investing (as in Romer, 1986), the rate of technological 
progress and the rate of growth of output per capita will consequently both be lower.  
Our hypothesis has the advantage that here we have an exogenous variable that 
affects the two endogenous variables in a predictable way, and this makes any 
empirical testing of the theory more robust. We will show how the relationship 
between inequality and growth can arise in the presence of natural resources. If 
natural resources affect both inequality and growth, then this could shed new light on 
the statistical relationship between inequality and growth. But to do this we need to 
identify, on theoretical grounds as well as empirically, the relationship between 
natural resources and inequality, on the one hand, and between natural resources and 
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2.1 Allocation of time  
Imagine a world in which natural resources generate a constant flow of riches. All one 
has to do is go out and pick the fruits of nature, be they diamonds, fish or oil. This 
could involve passively standing beneath an apple tree or a coconut palm and picking 
up the fruits that fall to the ground or one could have to exert oneself looking for 
fruits, diamonds or fish, to take a few examples. The value of each bundle of the 
natural resource is equal to R and the likelihood of finding a bundle increases with the 
time spent searching. Now imagine that amidst the bounties of nature there is a 
manufacturing industry that uses labor and capital to produce output without using or 
depending in any way on the natural resource. Assume, crucially for our argument, 
that workers face a more challenging and stimulating work environment in the 
manufacturing industry, because manufacturing is more likely to foster learning and 
innovation. In particular, assume that there is learning-by-investing in manufacturing.  
Workers have a choice when it comes to their work effort: they can spend part of 
or all of their time trying their luck picking fruits or they can take a paid job in 
industry. Each individual has to decide how much time to spend picking fruits and 
how much time to spend in paid employment. We denote the fraction of time spent in 
productive employment by β  and the fraction spent picking fruits by 1-β .  
Now assume that the discovery of a bundle of natural resources valued R is a 
random event and follows a Poisson distribution. Denote the number of such 
discoveries by the random variable N. The random event is then defined as “a worker 
finds a bundle of the natural resource during a unit of time” and has the following 
density:  












               for N = 0, 1, 2 …                                    
where the mean arrival rate – that is, the expected number of discoveries by a given 
worker or, equivalently, the probability that a discovery will be made by the worker 
within a unit of time – is  () ( ) β γ − = 1 N E . The expected number of discoveries for the 
representative individual is thus a linear function of the fraction of time spent 
searching. The larger the share of time spent in nature, the more bundles will be 
discovered. The parameter γ  measures search effectiveness.  
  7There are L individuals (identical by assumption) spending part of their time 
searching. The aggregate income from the natural resource is then 
(2)                     Y   NLR
n =
The expected value and the variance of N given by the Poisson distribution are both 
equal to  () β γ − 1 . Since all individuals are identical, it follows that the variance 
across the population in the number of discoveries of the natural resource bundles per 
unit of time is also equal to () β γ − 1 . We now have the following result: the variance 
of the distribution of income emanating from the natural resource is an increasing 
function of the time devoted by each worker to the natural-resource-based sector – 
primary sector, for short. Define income per capita by lower case letters. We then 
have  
(3)        ( ) () ( ) () R y R y E
n n β γ β γ − = − = 1 var , 1  
The expected per capita income or rent from the natural resource as well as the 
variance of this per capita income across the population of workers is an increasing 
function of the abundance of the resource R and also an increasing function of the 
time spent procuring it 1-β .  
We now turn to the manufacturing industry, which offers workers an alternative to 
wandering around nature. This industry uses capital and labor to produce output and 
offers opportunities for learning and innovation. The production function is  
( 4 )          Yq   () ( )
1





Here q denotes the quality of capital and takes a value between zero and one,
5 Ki and 
Li denote the capital and labor used by firm i and K is the aggregate capital stock in 
                                                 
5 Like Scott (1989), we distinguish between quantity and quality. If some investment projects miss the 
mark and fail to add commensurately to the capital stock, we have q < 1. There are three ways to 
interpret q: (a) as an indicator of distortions in the allocation of installed capital due to a poorly 
developed financial system, trade restrictions or government subsidies that attract capital to 
unproductive uses in protected industries or in state-owned enterprises where capital may be less 
productive than in the private sector (Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega, 2001); (b) as the ratio of the 
economic cost (i.e., minimum achievable cost) of creating new capital to the actual cost of investment 
(Pritchett, 2000) – that is, K is then measured on the basis of actual costs, which may overstate its 
productivity; or (c) as a consequence of aging: the larger the share of old capital in the capital stock 
currently in operation, i.e., the higher the average age of capital in use, the lower is its overall quality 
(Gylfason and Zoega, 2001a). For our purposes, the three interpretations are analytically equivalent. 
However, we assume that the quality of capital has remained constant in the past, which means that all 
units of capital are of the same quality. In other words, we are not interested here in the implications of 
  8the manufacturing sector. As in Romer (1986) the aggregate capital stock is a proxy 
for the accumulated knowledge that has been generated in the past through investment 
at all firms. This is what sets manufacturing apart from the primary sector; it uses 
capital and the installation of new units of capital generates a flow of ideas that raises 
productivity in a labor-augmenting fashion. In contrast, the primary sector does not 
offer similar opportunities for learning and innovation.  
We assume a perfectly competitive market for labor and capital. Assuming 
symmetric equilibrium, so that K=kL, gives the following first-order conditions for 
maximum profit, and also for equilibrium in the two factor markets:  




i β β α
α α = − =
− 1 1        
(6)                 () δ β α
α α + = =




i 1        
where w is the real wage, r is the real interest rate and δ  is the rate at which installed 
capital loses its usefulness over time, as a result of economic obsolescence as well as 
physical wear and tear (Scott, 1989).
6   
The representative worker/consumer has to make two decisions each moment of 
his infinite life. He has to decide how much to consume and save and how much time 
to spend working in the manufacturing sector rather than trying his luck in the 
primary sector. We assume that he cannot do both at the same time. Hence a decision 
to spend more time in the primary sector causes him to spend less time in paid 
employment making manufactures. Moreover, we assume that time spent in the 
primary sector is costly: a direct cost η  is incurred for each moment spent. Finally, 
there is a tax on wages tw and also a tax on income from the natural resources tn.  
The worker maximizes the discounted sum of future utility from consumption: 












where ρ  is the discount rate, subject to 
                                                                                                                                            
having different vintages of capital.  
6 The parameters q and δ  can both be modeled as endogenous choice parameters (as in Gylfason and 
Zoega, 2001a), but here we treat them as exogenous magnitudes for simplicity, even if we acknowledge 
that depreciation may depend on quality, through obsolescence. 
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By assumption, the worker does not gain any utility (or suffer disutility) in the 
primary sector, nor from being employed. The worker has assets a, which he 
accumulates if his earnings exceed expenditures (henceforth, we omit time 
subscripts). His earnings come from three sources: There is interest income on assets 
ra which is tax-free, there is wage income from employment β w, taxed at tw, and there 
is the value of the primary goods he picks or produces (1-β )R, taxed at tn. The worker 
then incurs the direct cost η  and consumes c per unit of time. A necessary condition 
for optimal consumption is  
(8)                                                          
1
λ
= c  
where λ  denotes the shadow price of wealth. Consumption is at an optimum when the 
marginal utility of consumption is equal to the shadow price of wealth at each instant.  
More interesting is equation (9), which helps determine the optimal allocation of time:  
(9)                 ()() η γ − − = − n w t R t w 1 1  
The left-hand side of equation (9) shows the marginal benefit from working longer in 
manufacturing net of taxes, while the right-hand side shows the marginal benefit from 
fruit picking, also net of taxes. While each worker takes wages w as given, wages do 
nevertheless respond to market forces. Combining equations (5) and (9) gives the 
following equation: 
(10)                      ()    ()() η γ β α
α α α − − = − −
− −
n w t R t L kq 1 1 1
1
Solving for β  gives 

























The time spent in industrial employment β  is decreasing in the value of the natural 
resource R and search effectiveness γ  as well as in taxes on wage income tw, and 
increasing in the accumulated knowledge in the manufacturing industry kL (=K), the 
productivity of capital q, taxes on natural resources tn and the cost of utilizing the 
natural resource η .  
 
  102.2 Work and growth  
We can now describe the various ways in which natural resources affect the allocation 
of labor in our model.  
•  The discovery of natural resources R raises the reward to producing primary 
output and reduces the optimal time spent in manufacturing.  
•  A decrease in the cost of producing primary output η  and an increase in search 
effectiveness γ  have an effect identical to that of a resource discovery: labor leaves 
manufacturing for the primary sector.  
•  The structure of the tax system affects the allocation of time. The higher are taxes 
on wages tw and the lower are taxes on income or rent from natural resource 
extraction tn, the more time is devoted to producing primary goods. 
•  History matters because past learning-by-investing in the industrial sector 
determines current knowledge as reflected by k and hence also real wages. The 
more advanced the manufacturing sector, the higher the wages it can afford to pay 
and the more time workers spend in manufacturing.  
The last point explains why natural resource abundance and dependence do not 
have to go together. Abundance of natural resources is a significant impediment to 
growth only if productivity and wages in the manufacturing sector are low, that is, if 
there is little accumulated knowledge and expertise in the sector. But the presence of 
abundant natural resources can prevent manufacturing from “taking off”, thereby 
preventing innovation and learning from taking place:  
•  When R is sufficiently high, or when productivity in the manufacturing sector is 
sufficiently low, it can be optimal not to spend any time in manufacturing. In this 
case, growth never takes off. 
Education provides a possible solution to this dilemma by increasing labor 
productivity in manufacturing: 
•  Education can increase knowledge, and thereby also labor productivity which, like 
past learning-by-doing, lifts wages and draws workers to the manufacturing 
industry from the primary sector.  
We now turn to the remaining necessary condition for maximum utility, the Euler 
equation giving optimal growth of consumption: 




  11Equations (6) and (12) give the optimal rate of growth of consumption and output: 
(13)                                       () ρ δ β α
α α − − =
− 1 L q g
Growth is an increasing function of β , the share of time spent producing manufactures 
rather than primary goods.  
There are two market failures in the model. The first is the standard one that firms, 
when investing, neglect the gains from learning and knowledge spillovers to other 
firms. In contrast, a social planner uses the average product of capital – not the private 
marginal product – to measure the cost of capital. Second, workers compare the 
current benefit from spending time in the two sectors but ignore the growth effect of 
industrial employment: by spending more time in the manufacturing industry they, 
collectively, would raise the marginal product of capital, the interest rate and 
economic growth. This makes their wages grow more rapidly. By withdrawing labor 
from the primary sector, workers would invest in a higher future wage. However, each 
worker has only a very small effect on growth imparting an external benefit to others. 
  We can now summarize the relationship between natural resources and growth. 
•  A rise in the natural resource rent R attracts more people to the primary sector in 
the hope of securing a piece of the action. These people leave the manufacturing 
sector, thereby lowering the private marginal product of capital, the rate of interest 
and the rate of growth of consumption and output. This is the Dutch disease 
working through the labor market (Paldam, 1997).  
•  When abundant natural resources reduce the incentive to provide good education 
(Gylfason, 2001), this reduces labor productivity and wages, hence reinforcing the 
incentive to stay in the natural resource sector. An abundant natural resource – a 
high value of R – attracts workers and this effect is reinforced by bad education 
which drives people away from industrial employment.  
•  If natural resources reduce the quality of society’s institutions, this could manifest 
itself in a reduction in the private cost of rent seeking η . Moreover, less developed 
capital markets are likely to generate a lower quality capital stock q, which 
depreciates at a higher rate δ  (Gylfason and Zoega, 2001a, 2001b).  
We can now combine these insights with the earlier result showing that the 
variance of income or rent emanating from the natural resource sector is  
  12(14)                                  ( ) () R y
n β γ − = 1 var   
Equations (13) and (14) show that while economic growth is increasing in β , 
inequality – measured by the variance of income – is decreasing in β . According to 
our thesis, any variable that increases the value of β  is likely to stimulate growth and 
reduce inequality. Equation (11) shows that an abundance of natural resources – 
relative to the level of technological know-how – will lower the value of β . In 
contrast, any variable that raises labor productivity and wages in the manufacturing 
sector will raise β , increase growth and reduce inequality. The knowledge that has 
been generated through past investment and production is one such factor. Another 
factor is the level of education. Education that raises productivity and wages in 
industry will discourage workers from spending time in the natural resource sector 
and hence raise growth and reduce inequality. At last, the tax system can affect 
growth and equality: a high tax on natural resource rents and a low tax on wages 
increases the value of β , hence raising growth and reducing inequality.  
 
3. Measuring inequality  
In what follows, we make use of three different measures of inequality. Take income 
inequality first. The Gini index measures the extent to which income (or, in some 
cases, consumption) among individuals or households within an economy deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality, 
while a Gini index of 100 means perfect inequality. As Figure 1 shows, the Gini index 
is closely correlated with the log of the ratio of the income or consumption of the 20 
percent of households with the highest incomes to the income or consumption of the 
20 percent of households with the lowest incomes (the “20/20 ratio”). In our sample, 
the 20/20 ratio is lowest (2.6, Gini = 19.5) in the Slovak Republic and highest in 
Sierra Leone (57.6, Gini = 62.9). The regression line through the scatter in Figure 1 
shows that each ten-point increase in the Gini index goes along with roughly a 
doubling of the 20/20 ratio. Thus, for example, the Nordic countries have a Gini index 
of 25 and a 20/20 ratio of 3 whereas the United Kingdom has a Gini index of 35 and a 
20/20 ratio of 6. The corresponding figures are 30 and 4 for Germany and 40 and 8 for 
the United States as well as for China and Russia. The data come from nationally 
representative household surveys and refer to different years between 1983-85 and 
  131998-99 (World Bank, 2000, Table 2.8). The data refer to either (a) personal or 
household incomes before taxes and transfers or (b) consumption expenditures and, 
hence, implicitly incomes after taxes and transfers. Whenever possible, consumption 
was used rather than income (same source). The Gini index of income inequality is 
available for 75 of the 87 countries in our sample.  
 
Figure 1. The Gini Index and the 20/20 Ratio










































Our second inequality measure is intended to reflect one aspect of social inequality, 
that is, the unequal access of males and females to education. We take the difference 
between the average secondary-school enrolment rates of males and females in 1980-
1997 to represent gender inequality in education. In a majority of cases where the 
rates are different, more males than females go to secondary school. In some cases, 
however, more females than males attend secondary schools. Even so, we use the 
arithmetic rather than absolute difference between male and female enrolment rates as 
our inequality measure. This means that we view a change from a situation where, 
say, the secondary-school enrolment rate for males is 17 percentage points higher than 
that for females (as in Egypt) to a situation where the secondary-school enrolment rate 
for females is 17 percentage points higher than that for males (as in Finland) as a 
decrease in gender inequality. Surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that there is in our sample 
no discernible correlation between income inequality as measured by the Gini index 
  14and gender inequality of education as measured by the excess of male over female 
secondary-school enrolment. Thus economic and social inequality, as measured here, 
do not necessarily go hand in hand.  
 
Figure 2. Income Inequality and Gender Inequality
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Figure 3. Income Inequality and Initial Income: 
The Kuznets Curve
y = -3.8595x
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  15Our cross-country data support the notion of a Kuznets curve: income inequality tends 
to increase with income at low levels of income and to decrease with income at higher 
levels of income, as shown in Figure 3. Galor and Moav (1999) suggest the following 
interpretation of the Kuznets curve: in early stages of development, when investment 
in physical capital is the main engine of economic growth, inequality spurs growth by 
directing resources towards those who save and invest the most, whereas in more 
mature economies human capital accumulation takes the place of physical capital 
accumulation as the main source of growth, and inequality impedes growth by hurting 
education because poor people cannot fully finance their education in imperfect credit 
markets. On the other hand, the gender inequality of education varies inversely and 
linearly with initial income, without any visible tendency for gender inequality to 
increase with income at low levels of income (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Gender Inequality and Initial Income
y = 0.4145x
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The third measure of inequality that we will use is the Gini index for the distribution 
of land. This measure is taken from Deininger and Olinto (2000), and covers 50 of the 
87 countries in our sample. Figure 5 shows that, almost without exception, land is less 
equally distributed than income in our sample. Spearman’s rank correlation between 
the two measures is 0.57.  
 
  16Figure 5. Distribution of Income and Land
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4. Cross-country patterns in the data 
In this section, we allow the data to speak for themselves in the form of a series of 
bivariate cross-sectional correlations. We first take a look at the correlations between 
our three measures of inequality and economic growth, all of which are 
unambiguously negative in our data: greater inequality in the distribution of income 
and land as well as in access to education tends to go together with lower rates of 
growth. We then move on to show that two of the three measures of inequality 
increase from country to country in tandem with the share of natural capital in 
national wealth. This opens up the possibility that it is the variation in natural capital 
in the sample that generates the apparent relationship between inequality and growth: 
when natural resources become more important, inequality rises and growth recedes. 
This was the prediction of our model in Section 2. At last, we also show that income 
inequality and three different measures of education are inversely related, while 
education and growth are positively correlated. This finding accords with earlier 
research indicating that education, by reducing inequality and fostering growth, can 
help clarify the inverse relationship between inequality and growth that is observed in 
the data. Unlike natural resource abundance, however, education is probably best 
viewed as an endogenous variable, a possibility that we address explicitly in the 
  17regression analysis presented in Section 5.  
 
4.1 Inequality and growth  
Let us now begin by looking at the cross-country pattern of income inequality and 
economic growth. Figure 6 shows a scatterplot of the annual rate of growth of gross 
national product (GNP) per capita from 1965 to 1998 (World Bank, 2000, Table 1.4) 
and the inequality of income or consumption as measured by the Gini index (same 
source, Table 2.8). The growth rate has been adjusted for initial income: the variable 
on the vertical axis is that part of economic growth that is not explained by the 
country’s initial stage of development, obtained as a residual from a regression of 
growth during 1965-1998 on initial GNP per head (i.e., in 1965) as well as the share 
of natural capital in national wealth, taken from World Bank (1997). The 75 countries 
shown in the figure are represented by one observation each.
7 The regression line 
through the scatterplot suggests that an increase of about 12 points on the Gini scale 
from one country to another is associated with a decrease in per capita growth by one 
percentage point per year on average. Twelve points on the Gini scale correspond 
roughly to the difference between income inequality in the United Kingdom (Gini = 
36) and in Sweden and Japan (Gini = 25). The relationship in Figure 6 is statistically 
significant (Spearman’s rank correlation is -0.50). If rich countries and poor are 
viewed separately, a similar pattern is observed in both groups (not shown). Shaving 
one percentage point off any country’s annual growth rate is a serious matter because 
the (weighted) average rate of per capita growth in the world economy since 1965 has 
been about 1½ percent per year. We see no signs of the positive cross-sectional 
relationship between inequality and growth in rich countries reported by Barro (2000), 
nor do we see any evidence of the nonlinearity in the panel relationship documented 
by Banerjee and Duflo (2000a, 2000b).  
Figures 7 and 8 tell a similar story. Here we see the cross-country pattern of per 
capita growth as measured in Figure 6 and gender inequality of education (Figure 7) 
and land inequality (Figure 8). The pattern is not as clear as in Figure 6, but it is still 
statistically significant (Spearman’s rank correlation is -0.32 and -0.37, respectively). 
                                                 
7 All countries for which the requisite data are available are included in all the figures in the paper, 
without exception.  
 
 
  18The number of countries is 75 and 50 in the two figures. All countries for which the 
requisite data are available are included in all the figures in the paper, without 
exception. 
 
Figure 6. Income Inequality and Economic 
Growth
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Figure 7. Gender Inequality and Economic 
Growth
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  19Figure 8. Land Inequality and Economic Growth
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4.2 Natural resources, inequality and growth 
In Figure 9, we measure natural resource dependence by the share of natural capital in 
national wealth in 1994 – i.e., the share of natural capital in total capital, which 
comprises physical, human and natural capital (though not social capital; see World 
Bank, 1997). The natural capital variable is intended to come closer to a direct 
measurement of the intensity of natural resources across countries than the various 
proxies that have been used in earlier studies, mainly the share of primary (i.e., non-
manufacturing) exports in total exports or in gross domestic product (GDP) and the 
share of the primary sector in employment or the labor force. The latter proxies may 
be prone to bias due to product and labor market distortions.  
Figure 9 shows that the share of natural capital in national wealth is positively 
correlated with income inequality as measured by the Gini index. Spearman’s rank 
correlation is 0.41. Notice the cluster of five countries (Niger, Guinea-Bissau, 
Madagascar, Mali, and Zambia, in descending order) in the northeast corner of the 
figure with a natural capital share above 35 and Gini above 45. Even if this cluster is 
removed from the sample, the pattern remains statistically significant. Notice, further, 
the two countries (Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic) with a natural 
capital share of around 30 and Gini above 60. If this pair of observations is omitted, 
  20the pattern remains significant.  If, however, both clusters (i.e., all seven countries) 
are removed from the sample, the remaining pattern becomes insignificant in a 
statistical sense. In this sense, this group of seven African countries in the northeast 
corner of the figure explains the inverse correlation. Even so, we are inclined to keep 
these African countries in our sample. We find it instructive that no country with a 
natural capital share above 25 has a Gini coefficient below 45.  
 
Figure 9. Income Inequality and Natural Capital
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Figure 10 shows that the natural capital share is also positively correlated with gender 
inequality as measured by the male minus female secondary-school enrolment rate. 
Spearman’s rank correlation is 0.32. The pattern observed is statistically significant 
with or without the seven African countries mentioned above. Moreover, there is a 
positive albeit insignificant correlation between land inequality and natural capital in 
our sample (not shown); Spearman’s rank correlation is 0.19.  
From Figures 9 and 10 combined with Figure 11, which shows that the natural 
capital share varies inversely with per capita economic growth from 1965 to 1998 
across the same group of countries, we conclude that these findings may help explain 
the inverse cross-sectional relationship between inequality and growth shown in 
Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 11, the rank correlation between natural capital and growth 
(r = -0.64) is statistically significant, and remains so even if the two clusters in the 
  21southwest corner and the northeast corner of the figure are excluded from the sample 
(see Gylfason and Zoega, 2001b).  
 
Figure 10. Gender Inequality and Natural Capital
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Figure 11. Natural Capital and Economic Growth 
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  22At last, Figure 12 shows that, in our sample, natural capital is also inversely and 
significantly correlated with public expenditure on education (r = -0.32). Natural 
capital is also inversely and significantly related to years of schooling for girls and 
secondary-school enrolment for both genders (not shown).  
 
Figure 12. Natural Capital and Expenditure on 
Education
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4.3 Inequality and education 
Let us now consider the three above-mentioned measures of education inputs, 
outcomes and participation and how they vary with inequality and economic growth. 
Figure 13 shows a scatterplot of public expenditure on education from 1980 to 1997 
as reported by UNESCO (see World Bank, 2000, Table 2.9) and income inequality. 
Public expenditure on education varies a great deal from country to country. In the 
1990s, some countries spent as little as 1 percent of their GNP on education (Haiti, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria and Sudan). Others have spent between 8 percent and 
10 percent of their GNP on education, including St. Lucia, Namibia, Botswana and 
Jordan, in descending order. Public expenditure is admittedly an imperfect measure of 
a nation’s commitment to education, not least because some nations spend more on 
private education than others. Moreover, public expenditure on education may be 
supply-led and of mediocre quality, and may thus fail to foster efficiency, equality 
  23and growth, in contrast to private expenditure on education, which is generally 
demand-led and thus, perhaps, likely to be of a higher quality. Even so, this yardstick 
should reflect at least to some extent the government’s commitment to education. The 
regression line through the 74 observations in Figure 13 suggests that an increase in 
public expenditure on education by one percent of GNP from one country to the next 
is associated with a decrease of 2.3 points in the Gini index. The relationship is 
statistically significant (r = -0.36).  
 
Figure 13. Expenditure on Education and Income 
Inequality










































Figure 14 shows scatterplots of the expected number of years of schooling for females 
from 1980 to 1997 and income inequality. This indicator of schooling is intended to 
reflect the total education resources, measured in school years, that a girl will acquire 
over her lifetime in school or as an indicator of an education system’s overall state of 
development. In Figure 14, the regression line through the 46 observations, one per 
country, suggests that an increase by one year of the schooling that an average girl at 
the age of school entry can expect to receive is associated with a decrease in the Gini 
index, i.e., increased equality, by almost one point. The relationship is statistically 
significant (r = -0.49). Unlike the relationship in Figure 13, the one in Figure 14 is 
significantly nonlinear (not shown), suggesting that the marginal effect of increased 
  24education on equality is rising in the level of education – that is, there may be 
increasing returns to schooling in terms of equality. Sen (1999), among others, 
emphasizes the importance of educating girls in developing countries. The 
corresponding relationship for males (not shown) is virtually the same as for females. 
 
Figure 14. Years of Schooling and Income 
Inequality











0 5 10 15 20





























In Figure 15, we present a scatterplot of secondary-school enrolment and income 
inequality. The pattern is clear: an increase in secondary-school enrolment by five 
percent of each cohort goes hand in hand with a decrease in the Gini index by one 
point. The data exhibit a similar, albeit not quite as strong, relationship between 
secondary-school enrolment and gender inequality (not shown). The same applies to 
Figures 13 and 14: public expenditure on education and years of schooling for girls 
are also inversely related to gender inequality (not shown). All three measure of 
education are positively correlated with economic growth (not shown).  
These patterns seem to suggest that more and better education goes along with less 
inequality as well as more rapid growth and that human capital, like natural capital, 
thus can perhaps help explain the inverse relationship between inequality and growth 
that we observe in the data. To find out, we need to dig a little deeper.  
 
  25Figure 15. School Enrolment and Income 
Inequality
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5. Regression analysis 
Table 1 reports seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates of a system of five 
equations for the 87 countries in our sample for the years 1965-1998. The equations 
reveal how natural capital intensity can affect growth through various channels: 
through investment, education and inequality, as well as directly.  
 
5.1 The model and estimation 
The first equation shows how economic growth depends on (a) the logarithm of initial 
per capita income (i.e., in 1965), defined as income in 1998 divided by an appropriate 
growth factor, (b) the share of natural capital in national wealth (which comprises 
physical, human and natural capital), (c) the share of gross domestic investment in 
GDP in 1965-1998, (d) the log of the secondary-school enrolment rate (the log in 
order to capture diminishing returns to education), (e) the Gini index and (f) gender 
inequality of education as measured by the difference between male and female 
secondary-school enrolment rates in 1980-1997. This equation can be interpreted 
either as a description of endogenous long-run growth or of medium-term growth in 
the neoclassical model where economic growth is exogenous in the long run. Initial 
income is intended to capture conditional convergence. Natural capital is another 
  26exogenous determinant of growth. Investment and education are intended to capture 
the contribution of physical and human capital accumulation to growth. The 
inequality measures reflect the hypothesized effects of income and gender inequality 
on growth.  
 



































0.68  74 
Investment 
rate 
   -0.20 
(3.98) 







      0.70  87 






     0.31  74 
Gender 
inequality 
   0.25 
(2.98) 
       0.09  87 
Note: Estimation method: SUR. t-ratios are shown within parentheses. Constant terms are not 
reported to conserve space.  
 
The second equation shows the relationship between the investment rate and the 
natural capital share (as spelled out in Gylfason and Zoega, 2001b; the underlying 
explanation is that increased dependence on natural resources reduces the share of 
physical capital in GDP and thereby weakens the incentive to save and invest by our 
extension of the Golden Rule).  
The third equation shows how the enrolment rate depends on initial income 
(because wealthy countries can afford to spend more on education) as well as on 
natural capital (as in Gylfason, 2001, and Gylfason and Zoega, 2001b; the idea behind 
this formulation is that the natural-resource-intensive sector may find it profitable to 
use workers with fewer skills than the manufacturing sector).  
The fourth equation shows the relationship between the Gini index, initial income 
(i.e., the Kuznets curve) and the natural capital share that we documented in Section 
4. The fifth and last equation shows the relationship between gender inequality and 
the natural capital share. To recapitulate, our hypothesis from Section 2 is that 
because natural resource ownership tends to be less equally distributed than other 
assets, countries that depend heavily on their natural resources tend to have a less 
equal distribution of income, education and land than countries that are less dependent 
  27on their natural wealth.  
The recursive nature of the system and the conceivable correlation of the error 
terms in the four equations make SUR an appropriate estimation procedure (Lahiri 
and Schmidt, 1978). However, the fact that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 
the system (not shown) are almost identical to the SUR estimates shown in Table 1 
indicates that the correlation of error terms across equations is of minor consequence. 
In our data, each country is represented by a single observation. This is because our 
data on natural resources are limited to a single year, 1994. In view of this, our 
analysis is confined to a cross section of countries, even if panel data on income 
distribution have recently become available (Deininger and Squire, 1996). An 
extension of our analysis to panels must await richer data on natural capital. This may 
be important because some writers (e.g., Forbes, 2000) have reported panel regression 
results on inequality and growth that seem to go against some of the results that have 
been obtained from cross-sectional studies (but see Banerjee and Duflo, 2000b, who 
disagree with Forbes, and also Bénabou, 1996).  
 
5.2 Empirical results 
All the coefficient estimates shown in Table 1 are economically and statistically 
significant, with one exception (see below). The coefficient on initial income in the 
growth equation indicates a conditional convergence speed of 1.3 percent per year. 
The direct effect of the natural capital share on growth is -0.05 and the indirect effects 
through investment and education are -0.20*0.11 = -0.022 and -(0.03)*1.08 = -0.032. 
The additional indirect effect of the natural capital share on growth via the Gini index 
is 0.30*(-0.04) = -0.012. The total effect of natural capital on growth is, therefore, 
about -0.12 (for given initial income). Hence, the income distribution channel 
accounts for about one-tenth of the total effect of natural capital intensity on growth. 
Of additional interest here are the effects of education and inequality on growth. 
The first equation in the table shows the direct effect of education on growth to be 
1.08/E = 0.025, evaluated at the mean value of the secondary-school enrolment rate, E 
= 0.43; this means that an increase in the enrolment rate by ten percentage points from 
one country to another increases growth by one-fourth of a percentage point. The 
direct effect of increased income inequality on growth is also rather strong: an 
increase in the Gini index by 15 points, which corresponds to the difference between 
Norway (Gini = 26) and the United States (Gini = 41), from one place to another is 
  28associated with a decrease in growth by 0.6 percentage points which, in turn, is about 
a half of the average per capita growth in our sample over the period under review. 
On the other hand, we do not find significant evidence of a negative effect of 
increased gender inequality of education and economic growth; the coefficient 
reported in the top line of Table 1 is negative, true, but small and insignificant. Even 
so, an increase in the natural capital share increases both types of inequality 
significantly and substantially. Thus, an increase in the natural capital share by ten 
percentage points from one country to another increases the Gini index by three points 
and the difference between male and female secondary-school enrolment rates by two 
and a half percentage points; the latter type of increased inequality, however, does not 
significantly hamper growth.  
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of the natural capital share and the 
secondary-school enrolment rate in the growth equation does not reverse the sign of 
the estimated coefficient of the Gini index. In particular, the relationship between 
growth and inequality remains negative, in contrast to the results of Forbes (2000). 
However, the size of the income distribution effect is reduced by about a half by the 
inclusion of the natural capital and school enrolment variables. This seems to suggest 
that in growth equations without natural capital and education, the income distribution 
variable picks up a good part of the influence of the omitted variables. Our cross-
sectional results bear out a long-term relationship between inequality and growth 
while the pooled estimation of Forbes (2000) reflects short- to medium-term 
relationships by her own reckoning. It is also possible that the inclusion of omitted, 
country-specific variables other than natural capital and education could reverse the 
sign of the coefficient of the Gini index.  
Notice, at last, that the data support the notion of a Kuznets curve relating income 
inequality and initial income. There is, however, no comparable nonlinear relationship 
between gender inequality and initial income. In our data, initial income has no 
significant effect on investment across countries.  
 
5.3 Other possibilities 
We have experimented with several variations of the model specification in Table 1.  
First, we added natural capital per person as a proxy for natural resource 
abundance in order to distinguish between natural resource abundance and natural 
resource intensity (as in Gylfason and Zoega, 2001b). By intensity, or dependence, we 
  29mean the importance of natural resources to the national economy, while abundance 
refers to the supply (per capita) of the natural resources. Some countries – Australia, 
Canada and the United States, to name a few – have abundant natural resources but 
are not particularly dependent upon them, not any more. Our argument has been that it 
is natural resource dependence that matters for inequality and growth. We do not 
expect Australia, Canada or the United States to suffer from their abundance of 
natural resources, far from it. When we add natural capital per person as an 
independent explanatory variable to each equation in Table 1, it turns out that natural 
resource abundance encourages economic growth, investment and education and 
reduces gender inequality, but has no effect on income inequality. In other respects, 
the results remain virtually the same as in Table 1. This means that increased 
dependence on natural resources hurts growth, as we hypothesized, while increased 
abundance helps (for more, see Gylfason and Zoega, 2001b).  
Next, we entered the natural capital share and the Gini index of income inequality 
multiplicatively rather than additively in our growth equation in order to study the 
interaction between the two variables. Now the coefficient of the multiple is -0.0011 
(with t = 3.72). This means that the negative effect of natural resource dependence on 
growth varies directly with income inequality: the more unequal the distribution of 
income, the greater is the adverse effect of natural resource dependence on growth. 
Evaluated at the mean value of the Gini index in our sample (42), the effect of the 
natural capital share on growth is -0.05 as in Table 1. This new specification also 
means that the negative effect of income inequality on growth varies directly with 
natural resource dependence: the greater the natural capital share, the greater is the 
adverse effect of income inequality on growth. Evaluated at the mean value of the 
natural capital share in our sample (12), the effect of income inequality on economic 
growth is -0.013, which is smaller than the coefficient of the Gini index in the first 
equation in Table 1. When we replace the Gini index of income inequality in the 
above experiment with our measure of gender inequality or of land inequality, we 
obtain the same results: the greater the natural capital share, the greater is the adverse 
effect of increased inequality on growth.  
Third, we replaced our gender inequality measure (the arithmetic difference 
between male and female secondary-school enrolment rates) by the absolute difference 
between male and female enrolment rates. The new measure means that a change from a 
situation where more boys than girls go to school to one where more girls than boys 
  30go to school leaves gender inequality unchanged if the numbers are the same. When 
we re-estimate our system using this new measure, increased gender inequality 
reduces economic growth directly: the coefficient on gender inequality in the first 
equation in Table 1 is now -0.05 with t = 2.09. In this case, however, the effect of the 
natural capital share on gender inequality becomes small and statistically insignificant 
(the coefficient is 0.08 with t = 1.47). In other respects, the regression results (not 
shown) are very similar to those reported in Table 1.  
Our fourth and last experiment involves Africa and Latin America. When we add 
a dummy variable for Africa to each equation in our model, in case Africa might be 
different from other regions, as some studies have shown, the dummy coefficient has 
the expected sign everywhere, but it is statistically significant only in the equations 
for education and the Gini index. The annual rate of per capita growth in Africa is 
thus three quarters of a percentage point smaller than elsewhere according to our 
results (not shown), but the difference is not significant (t = 1.73). The investment rate 
is almost two percentage points lower in Africa than elsewhere, but again the 
difference is insignificant (t = 1.38). The secondary-school enrolment rate is 15 
percentage points lower in Africa than elsewhere (evaluated at the sample mean), and 
this difference is significant (t = 3.23). Gender inequality in education is also 
significantly greater in Africa than elsewhere, by almost five percentage points (t = 
2.15). There is, on the other hand, no significant difference between the Gini index in 
Africa and the rest of our sample. All the estimates shown in Table 1 remain 
essentially intact in the presence of the African dummy. When we add a dummy 
variable for Latin America (with or without Central America) rather than for Africa, 
the dummy has no effect on growth, investment or education, but it does matter for 
distribution; specifically, the Latin dummy reduces gender inequality by 7.5 
percentage points (t = 2.48) and increases the Gini index of income inequality by ten 
points (t = 3.20). Again, our estimates in Table 1 remain unchanged. We conclude that 
the specification of our model in Table 1 is sufficiently broad to render the inclusion 
of regional dummy variables superfluous.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The inverse empirical relationship between inequality and economic growth across 
countries that has emerged from several recent studies has spurred several authors to 
  31suggest various potential theoretical explanations for the relationship. These 
explanations have generally been of the following kind: inequality is bad for some 
variable X – for example, education – and X is good for growth, so increased 
inequality hurts growth by hurting X. We approach this issue from a different angle: 
we argue that a country’s dependence on its natural resources influences both 
inequality and growth. We show – both theoretically and empirically – how variations 
in the share of natural resources in national wealth can help explain the inverse 
relationship between inequality and economic growth across countries.  
The essence of our story is this: if the distribution of ownership of natural 
resources is more unequal than the distribution of other forms of wealth, the 
inequality of the distribution of income, education or land is directly related to the 
share of natural resources in national income. Specifically, we show – in the context 
of an endogenous-growth model of the simplest kind – how natural resources can 
reduce growth and increase inequality by attracting workers away from higher 
technology industries. Our data appear to confirm this prediction: they suggest that 
the Gini index of income inequality as well as gender inequality varies directly with 
the share of natural capital in national wealth. The data also bear out an inverse 
relationship between economic growth and the share of natural capital in national 
wealth.  
  Differences in human capital across countries appear also to help explain the 
inverse cross-country correlation between economic growth and inequality. More and 
better education – measured by secondary-school enrolment, years of schooling or 
public expenditure on education – is associated with less inequality and more rapid 
growth in our data. This suggests a clear role for public policy in combating the 
potentially adverse effects of excessive dependence on natural resources on income 
inequality and growth. In addition, tax policy can be used to combat the adverse effect 
of natural resources on inequality and growth. When income or rent from natural 
resource extraction is taxed at a higher rate than wage income, this discourages 
workers from spending time in the natural resource sector, raises the marginal product 
of capital in manufacturing, increases the real rate of interest and thereby also the rate 
of growth of output and consumption per capita.  
Our regression results suggest that natural capital intensity reduces growth directly 
as well as indirectly by reducing equality, secondary-school enrolment rates and 
investment rates. This leaves an important role for public policy, which can be used to 
  32encourage growth by enhancing equality, among other things. We conclude that the 
trade-off between equality and (dynamic) efficiency is affected by both natural and 
human capital, as well as by tax policy. 
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